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Abstract
This paper examines the National Assembly and the 
budget process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic with a view 
to tackling the perennial problem of late presentation 
of the Appropriation Bill by successive Presidents to 
the National Assembly; a laxity that has caused delay 
in the passage of the Appropriation Acts. The paper 
argues that since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, 
successive Presidents have failed to meet the best practice 
of presenting the budget to the National Assembly 2-4 
months before the commencement of the next fiscal 
year. This development is attributed to Section 81(1) 
of the 1999 Constitution which provides the timeframe 
for presentation of budget estimates to the National 
Assembly without timeline. These delays frequently 
cause reversionary budget provision and denies the 
people dividends of democracy. To ensure timeliness in 
the passage of the Appropriation Acts, Sections 81(1) and 
82 of the 1999 Constitution and the FRA 2007 require 
amendment. A budget law such as the US Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 1974, ought to be 
enacted.
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INTRODUCTION
Nigeria’s National Assembly (NASS), just as most 
legislatures in other democracies,  is  the arm of 
government charged with the responsibility for law 
making and oversight functions over the other arms 
of government.  This basic and core law making 
responsibility is conferred on the National Assembly 
by the 1999 Constitution. Section 4 of the constitution 
empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the Federation or 
any part thereof. This power covers matters on both the 
Exclusive and Concurrent Legislative Lists set out in the 
First and Second Schedules of Part 1 of the Constitution 
which impliedly includes the Appropriation Act.
Section 81 of the 1999 Constitution mandates the 
President to cause to be prepared and laid before each 
House of the National Assembly, at any time in the 
financial year, estimates of the revenues and expenditures 
of the Federation for the next following financial year. 
Since 1999, successive Presidents have persistently laid 
the budget estimates in the NASS very late in the year. 
Even the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari 
elected in 2015 presented the budget late. It was only in 
2001 and 2007 that budgets presented to the National 
Assembly were approved before January and this was 
because the budgets were approved without thorough 
scrutiny.
Late presentation of the budget often led to late 
approval resulting in the distortion and/or haphazard 
implementation of the budget. Therefore, the exponential 
increase in the size of the national budget from 701.06 
billion Naira in the year 2000 to 4.493 trillion Naira in 
2015, has not translated into increased socio-economic 
development. Obadan (2014, p.15) succinctly captured 
this gloomy picture as, “… the government budget has 
generally not met the expectation of quality economic 
growth, poverty reduction, high level of employment, 
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first grade infrastructure … and general improvement in 
quality life style of the citizens”. The implication is that 
the Nigerian budget has, over the period, been reduced to 
mere annual rituals.
Piqued by the preceding scenario, the 7th National 
Assembly in its 2011 Legislative Agenda, determined to 
correct the anomaly in the appropriation process. Despite 
its commitment, only one that of 2013—of the four 
Appropriation Bills presented to it during its four year 
life, came in October while each of the rest was presented 
in December, barely two weeks to the next fiscal year. 
The three were approved in the second quarter of the new 
fiscal year. The Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007 
which was enacted as a panacea to the appropriation 
process, just as the Legislative Agenda of the 7th 
National Assembly, also failed. Between 2012 and 2015, 
the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), 
the document from which the FRA, in Section 18, 
mandatorily provides that the Appropriation Bill under 
Section 81 of the Constitution be derived, were presented 
to the National Assembly not earlier than September 
of each of those years and, except for 2015 which was 
approved in March 2015, were all approved in December.
The pertinent questions arises: Is the FRA a mine 
layer or a mine sweeper in the budget and appropriation 
process? To what extent have late budget submissions and 
enactments impacted on budget implementation? This 
paper attempts to identify and establish the constraints 
of budget and appropriation process in Nigeria between 
1999 and 2015 with a view to addressing the problem of 
timeliness.
1. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL 
ISSUES
Niskanen (1971) showed that bureaucrats have strong 
incentives to try to maximise the bureaucrat’s budget. 
This is often made feasible by information asymmetry 
and bilateral monopoly heavily weighted in favour of the 
bureaucrats as against their sponsors. The bureau chief 
usually knows more about the politician’s demand than the 
politician knows about the cost of supply. Since legislative 
measures and government’s policies are usually matters 
of open public knowledge, the bureau chief easily knows 
the politician’s demands for bureau services. Thus, the 
politician is not in a position to easily conceal his demands 
for bureaucratic supply of services. The politician cannot 
easily learn the costs of supply of a particular bureau 
(Simandan, 2009). Since no one is in a position to know 
better than the bureau chief the opportunity for incurring 
costs, the bureau chief has an incentive to be secretive. 
Therefore, the bureau chief has the ability to increase the 
bureau’s budget more than optimal. Such an increment 
could corruptly benefit both the politician and the bureau 
chief along with the lower level bureaucrat.
This view sheds some light on the incentive and 
motivation for the perennial late presentation of the 
national budget in the National Assembly. Although most 
constitutions specify that the executive prepares and 
submits a budget and that no fund may be withdrawn 
from the government’s coffers without authorisation 
vide an Act of parliament, beyond these fundamentals, 
constitutions range from vague to relatively specific roles 
of the legislature in the budget process (NDI, 2003). 
Where there are ambiguities, the stakes and prerogatives 
are up for grabs and the more assertive, more determined 
or the more politically powerful and dominant arm of 
government can bolster its influence if the conditions are 
right (NDI, 2003). This aptly captures the scenario of 
Nigeria’s budget process.
While Section 80(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
prohibits the withdrawal of funds from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the Federation save through an Act 
of the NASS passed pursuant to Section 81 of the 
same Constitution, Section 81 vests on the President 
the sole power to prepare and lay before the NASS the 
Appropriation Bill “at any time in each financial year”. 
A financial year runs from January 1st to December 31st 
in Nigeria. Therefore, the President is at liberty to lay the 
budget in the NASS at any time before or on the 31st day 
of December. President Buhari laid the 2016 budget in the 
National Assembly on December 22nd, the day the national 
legislators proceeded on break for both the Christmas and 
New Year indicating that no Appropriation Act would 
be in place by January 2016, the commencement of the 
financial year. Contrary to Section 80(2), the Constitution, 
vide Section 82, permits the President to authorise 
withdrawals from the Consolidated Revenue Fund should 
there be no approved budget after the commencement 
of the new fiscal year. Herein lies the incentive, as in 
Niskanen (1971) theory, for the late submission of the 
Appropriation Bill to the NASS by successive Presidents. 
Late submission of the budget robs the National 
Assembly of the required time for proper and adequate 
debate and scrutiny of the budget. External pressure by 
the electorates for the budget to pass on time often leads 
to a rubber stamped Appropriation Act. If a thorough 
debate and scrutiny of the budget were to be done, it 
would eventually lead to late approval, so attempts to 
prevent late approval, permit the executive to continue 
expending funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, 
not appropriated for by the National Assembly in line with 
Section 82. Such is the dilemma of the Nigerian National 
Assembly in the budget and appropriation process. For the 
executive, it is a win-win situation. 
2. CROSS - COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 
A legislature’s  power of  the purse is  usual ly a 
constitutional issue. In most democracies, the constitution 
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or law requires the executive to present the budget to 
the legislature at a specific period, usually before the 
beginning of a new fiscal year. The UK relies on tradition 
and precedent (Lienert, 2010; Posner & Park, 2007; NDI, 
2003). See Table 1. The desire for timely presentation 
of the budget to parliament is underpinned by the need 
to accord parliament enough time to deliberate, analyze, 
review and, where possible, amend the budget before 
passing same into law, usually, before the commencement 
of the new fiscal year. Posner and Park (2007) espouse 
that legislative influence over the budget is affected by the 
time available to consider a budget request. A legislature 
with a limited time to examine a budget proposal is at a 
disadvantage.
The time for the presentation and approval of the 
budget varies from clime to clime. The variation is as 
little as 15 days in Mexico and the UK, and as much as 
8 months in the United States (Lienert, 2010; Posner 
& Park, 2007; NDI, 2003). The timing of budget 
submission can, and does have, major consequences on 
the quality of analyses and deliberations by parliament 
(Posner & Park, 2007; NDI, 2003). Extant literature 
affirms that global best practice, especially among the 
OECD countries, puts the time for the presentation of the 
budget to parliament at 2-4 months before the beginning 
of the next fiscal year. The time allowed for parliament 
to deliberate and approve the budget is 2-3 months 
before the next fiscal year (Lienert, 2010). Posner and 
Park (2007, p.11) reported that “as part of recent budget 
reforms, some legislatures have established a more 
regularized process with more time for legislatures to 
consider budget requests”. According to these scholars, 
Mexico is among the countries that have instituted 
changes requiring Presidents to present their budgets 
earlier than before. Even the South African parliament 
which has less budgetary powers in appropriation 
(because it can only debate the budget but cannot amend 
government’s budget proposal), has between three and 
four months to consider the executive’s budget before 
the next financial year (NDI, 2003). 
Table 1
Comparative Timeline for Submission of Budget Estimates to the Legislature
Number of months in advance 
of fiscal year
Legal Requirement 
Practice (no legal 
requirement)Constitution Law Regulation of parliament
More than 6 months United States (8 months)
4-6 months Demark(4 months), Finland Germany (4 months) Norway (4 months)
2-4 months France, Spain (3 months), Korea (90 days)
Japan (2-3 months), 
Sweden (31/3 months)
0-2 months Canada
After year begins
New Zealand (no later 
than one month after year 
begins)
United Kingdom
Source: Lienert (2010). 
3. THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
AND LAW MAKING 
The dynamics of the budget process in Nigeria cannot be 
fully comprehended except the procedure for law making 
in the National Assembly is appreciated. The Nigerian 
National Assembly is established under chapter 5 of the 
1999 Constitution as a bicameral legislature consisting 
of the Senate (with 109 members) and the House of 
Representatives (with 360 members). 
In Sections 58 and 59, the 1999 Constitution provides 
for the mode by which the National Assembly is to 
exercise its law making powers conferred by Section 
4. Section 58 provides that the power of the National 
Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by Bills passed 
by both the Senate and House of Representatives and 
assented to by the President. Sections 58 and 59 clearly 
reveals that the Constitution distinguishes a general from 
a money bill, and sets two different approaches to the 
mode of their passage (this is also detailed in the Senate 
and the House of Representatives Standing Orders). The 
dichotomy between a general bill and a money bill is 
made clearer by Section 81. While the Constitution is 
silent on who should or should not introduce a general 
bill, it is clear that the responsibility of initiating and 
introducing a money bill to the National Assembly is 
exclusively vested on the President. 
4. LAW MAKING PROCEDURE
4.1 General Bills
Are bills introduced into one chamber of the National 
Assembly, passed by the Chamber and concurred (or is 
finally agreed to when amendments are made) in identical 
form by the other chamber. After the President’s assent 
or where the President’s veto was overridden by two-
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thirds majority of the Members of each House sitting 
separately, the bill becomes an Act of the National 
Assembly. The Standing Orders of the Senate and House 
of Representatives provide the following stages through 
which a bill shall undergo to become an Act of the 
National Assembly. These stages are:
4.1.1 First Reading Stage
This is a formal or ritual stage. On the day the bill is 
placed on the Order Paper for First Reading, the bill is 
called and the Presiding Officer directs the Clerk to read 
the Short Title of the bill. The Clerk reads the Short Title 
of the bill and pronounces the magic words First Reading. 
No question is proposed. 
4.1.2 Second Reading Stage
On the day a bill is placed on the Order Paper for its 
Second Reading, the sponsor moves a motion that the bill 
be read a second time. If the motion does not secure a 
seconder, the bill fizzles out. However, if it is seconded, 
the sponsor leads a debate on the general principles of 
the bill, its merits and demerits and necessity. The bill is 
spoken to as opposed to speaking for or against as in the 
case of motions. Members take turn to debate the bill till 
the Presiding Officer brings the debate to a close or an 
end. At the close of debate, the Presiding Officer proposes 
the question that the bill be now read a second time and 
the vote is taken. If the question carries, the bill may 
be referred to the Committee of whole or to a relevant 
Committee or Committees with jurisdiction.
If the referral is to a Standing Committee(s), the bill 
is thoroughly scrutinized; this sometimes may require 
public hearing. Amendments may be proposed and a 
report is presented at plenary. The bill, if committed to the 
Committee of whole or the report of the Committee, it is 
considered by the Committee of whole clause by clause. 
In the senate, the Committee of whole is chaired by the 
Senate President while the Deputy Speaker chairs in the 
House of Representatives. If the report is approved, the 
chair reports to the plenary which may adopt the report.
4.1.3 Third Reading Stage
This is the stage at which a clean copy of the adopted 
report of the Committee on the bill is considered by the 
plenary. Only minor amendments may be introduced 
and considered save there is a substantive motion for re-
committal. The Leader then moves that the bill be read 
a third time. The Clerk reads the Long Title of the bill 
upon the directives of the Presiding Officer. The Presiding 
Officer repeats the Long Title of the bill and declares the 
bill “read the third time and passed”.
In a bi-cameral legislature, the bill as passed is 
sent to the second Chamber where it repeats the same 
procedure it went through in the first Chamber. If the 
second Chamber passes it with amendments, a conference 
committee is constituted to reconcile the two versions and 
submit a report thereon for the adoption of each House. 
4.1.4 The President’s Assent
After passing the bill in identical form, the Clerk 
forwards same to the President for assent. The President 
may assent or withhold assent. If assent is withheld, the 
bill may again be passed by two-thirds majority of the 
Members of each House sitting separately and the bill 
shall become law by the force of Section 58(4) of the 
Constitution. It has been judicially decided in National 
Assembly V. The President (2003) that the exercise of 
veto override requires that the bill goes through the whole 
legislative process again.
4.2 Money Bills
Although the National Assembly has the ultimate control 
over public funds, the Executive has the financial 
initiative. Only the President can request that an 
appropriation be made, increased or proposed to impose 
or increase taxation. This is constitutionally affirmed 
by section 81 of the Constitution. Section 49 of the 
Constitution provides for the mode by which the National 
Assembly may exercise its powers to enact money bills. 
The procedure for enacting money bills into law are, 
however provided for by the Senate and House Standing 
Orders.
Money bills, just as all other bills, must undergo three 
readings prior to being passed. However, the ritual of 
first reading, which general bills go through, is spared a 
money bill. By the Standing Orders, Cap. 11, r. 92(1)(b), 
Senate, and O.12, r.97(1)(b), House of Representatives, 
the laying of the Appropriation Bill in the NASS shall be 
deemed to have been read the first time and a date fixed 
for the commencement of second reading. Thus, after 
the President has presented the Appropriation Bill to the 
National Assembly, the Bill goes through the Second 
Reading Stage, Third Reading Stage, and Assent or Veto 
Override to become an Act of the National Assembly. All 
these stages are similar to the stages that a general bill 
goes through to become an Act of the National Assembly. 
For this reason, we will examine only the differences 
between the two in respect of each stage.
4.2.1 Second Reading Stage
After second reading, the bill  is  referred to the 
Appropriation Committee with Committees having 
jurisdiction collapsing into sub-committees of the 
Appropriation Committee. It is the Leader that moves the 
motion for the second reading of the bill and seconded 
by the Deputy Leader. Debate is confined to the general, 
financial and economic state of Nigeria as well as the 
government financial policy. Unlike a general bill, 
a money bill cannot be killed at the second reading 
stage but all Members have the right to debate the bill. 
Significantly, Committee work on the budget centres on 
budget defence as opposed to Committee hearings as is 
the case in general bills. At the close of the sub-committee 
work, the Appropriation Committee collects, collates and 
compiles a report which it lays at plenary. 
5 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Albert T. Sam-Tsokwa; Christopher Ochanja Ngara (2016). 
Canadian Social Science, 12(5), 1-7
The Report of the Appropriation Committee is 
considered by the Committee of Supply as opposed to 
by the Committee of Whole in the case of general bills. 
Also, in the House, the Speaker, rather than the Deputy 
Speaker, chairs the Committee while the Senate President 
chairs as is the case in general bills. After the approval of 
the schedules, the clauses are considered last as against 
the practice in general bills. The rest of the process is as in 
general bill save for veto override.
4.2.2 Third Reading Stage
This is exactly as is obtainable in a general bill. However, 
because the Constitution requires the President to lay the 
Appropriation Bill in each of the two Houses, there is no 
question of one House transmitting the Bill to the other 
House for concurrence. Rather, where one Chamber passes 
the bill and the other fails to pass its own two months 
after the commencement of the financial year, the Senate 
President is required by Section 59(2) of the Constitution 
to convene a meeting of the Joint Finance Committee to 
resolve the differences between the two Houses. Where, 
however, the Joint Finance Committee fails to resolve 
the differences, the Bill shall be presented to the National 
Assembly sitting at a joint meeting and if the Bill is 
passed at such joint sitting, it shall be presented to the 
President for assent. A resolution by the Joint Finance 
Committee must be adopted by each Chamber otherwise it 
shall be null and void in view of the provision of Section 
62(4) of the Constitution and the decision of the Supreme 
Court in A.G. Bendel State V. A. G. Federation (1981).
4.2.3 Assent
Assent to a money bill is governed by Section 59(4). 
Where a money bill has been passed in identical form by 
the National Assembly, the Clerk is required to forward 
same to the President for assent. The President has 30 
days within which to signify assent, withhold assent or 
do nothing. At the expiration of 30 days, if the President 
fails to give assent, the Bill shall be re-presented to 
the National Assembly, sitting at a joint meeting and if 
passed by two-thirds majority of both Houses at the joint 
meeting, the Bill shall become law. By the authority of 
National Assembly V. President (2003), for the Bill to be 
again validly passed by the joint meeting of the National 
Assembly, it has to go through the whole process of law 
making again. In the US, if the President does nothing 
within 10 days after a bill (general or money) is presented 
to him when Congress is on session, the bill shall 
automatically become law.
5. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE 
BUDGET PROCESS
Due to its special nature, only the President is mandated 
by section 59 of the 1999 Constitution to present the 
Appropriation Bill or Supplementary Appropriation 
Bill to the National Assembly. This implies that the 
National Assembly has little or no control over the 
time the Appropriation Bill is presented to it by the 
President. This is because from both the letters and 
spirit of the Constitution, the National Assembly is 
nowhere empowered to compel the President to make the 
presentation under Section 81(1) of the Constitution, nor 
make one itself should the President fail, as has always 
been the case, to make a timely presentation.
The ability to make timely and sensible fiscal choices 
is one of the hallmarks of good governance (Ekeocha, 
2012). Timely presentation and enactment of the national 
budget have become a matter of great concern. Timely 
budget presentation to the NASS has, over the years, 
become an exception rather than the norm. Both the 
Constitution and extant legislation seem to proffer no 
adequate remedy. Section 81 of the Constitution which 
mandates the President to lay the Appropriation Bill 
before the National Assembly gives the President the 
unparalleled latitude to do so at any time in each financial 
year before the next following financial year. The financial 
year in Nigeria, by virtue of Section 318(1) of the 
Constitution, runs from the 1st of January to the 31st day 
of December. The implication is that whilst the President 
has, constitutionally, between the 1st day of January and 
31st December of every year to lay the Appropriation Bill 
before the Assembly, the National Assembly has no such 
timeframe within which to approve the budget laid by the 
President. There is, thus, a timeframe with no timeline for 
the presentation and approval of the budget.
Since the Constitution did set a timeline for the 
President to lay the Appropriation Bill before the National 
Assembly, the timeframe provided in Section 81(1) can 
best be regarded as a blank cheque, and, just as all bank 
cheques, it is capable of, and has been a subject of abuse 
by all Presidents since return to democracy in 1999. 
Since 1999, no Nigerian President, has laid the budget 
before the National Assembly before October of any year. 
The earliest budget laid was on 10th October, 2012 (barely 
two months to the beginning of the next fiscal year). See 
Table 2. This is clearly outside the globally accepted 
period of 2-4 months for budget presentation and 2-3 
months for the deliberations and debate on the presented 
budget by the legislature. Consequently, most of the bills 
were approved and enacted into law in the second quarter 
of the year.
In an attempt to tackle lack of timeline in Section 
81(1), the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007 was 
enacted. Among the laudable innovations introduced 
by the FRA was the institutionalisation of the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF was 
to be submitted to the National Assembly for approval 
not later than August of every year. After the MTEF shall 
have been approved, the President is required to base 
his estimates under Section 81(1) of the Constitution 
on the MTEF. This was to ensure that the budget was 
a collaborative effort devoid of rancours. Sadly, since 
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Table 2
Presentation and Enactment of Federal Appropriation Acts 2003–2015 Fiscal Years
Fiscal year Date bill laid in the NASS
Date bill sent to president for 
assent
Date bill assented to by 
president Gestation period
2003 20-11- 2002 11-03-2003 10-04-2003 4 months, 21 days
2004 18-12-2003 20-04-2004 21-04-2004 4 months, 3 days
2005 12-10-2004 18-03-2005 12-04-2005 6 months
2006 06-12-2005 21-02-2006 22-02-2006 2months, 16 days
2007 11-10-2006 22-12-2006 22-12-2006 2 months, 12 days
2008 08-11-2007 27-03-2008 14-04-2008 5 months, 7 days
2009 02-12-2008 03-02-2009 10-03-2009 3months, 7 days
2010 23-11-2009 25-03-2010 22-04-2010 5 months
2011 15-12-2010 25-05-2011 26-05-2011 5months, 11 days
2012 15-12-2011 21-03-2012 13-04-2012 4 months, 2days
2013 10-10-2012 30 -01-2013 26-02-2013 3 months, 18 days
2014 19-12-2013 22-04-2014 21-05-2014 5 months, 3 days
2015 17-12-2014 06-05-2015 06-05- 2015 4months, 19 days 
Source: Obadan (2014); Rules and Business Committee Secretariat (2007-2015).
its enactment in 2007, no MTEF was laid in the National 
Assembly before September and none was approved by 
the Assembly before December (see Table 3). Thus, the 
FRA became a mine layer in the budget process rather 
than the mine sweeper it was meant to achieve.
Table 3
Presentation of MTEF for the Fiscal Years 2012-
2015 to the National Assembly by the President and 
Approval
Fiscal year Date of presentation Date of approval
2012
2012- 2014 04-10- 2011 01-12-2011
2013
2013- 2015 18- 09-2012 19-12-2012
2014
2014 - 2016 17- 09-2013 18-12-2013
2015
2015- 2017 17-12-2014 05-03-2015
Source: Rules and Business Committee Secretariat (2012-2015).
There have been calls for the repeal and, or amendment 
of Section 82 of the Constitution by scholars, such as 
Ekeocha (2012). Section 82 deals with reversionary 
budget. A reversionary budget takes effect when a 
previous budget has expired but a new one has not yet 
been enacted into law. Its tenor and spirit are in line and 
perfect harmony with country good practice especially 
among the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries (Lienert, 2010; 
Wehner, 2010). The rationale is to forestall government 
shutdown—a common feature in the US where there 
is no reversionary budget provision. A reversionary 
budget outcome, is, however, not without shortcomings. 
Reversion to last year’s budget is inconvenient for the 
government of the day, as it delays the implementation 
of a new initiative and investment projects (Wehner, 
2010, p.29). 
6. TACKLING THE CHALLENGES OF 
TIMELINESS
The FRA 2007 is an excellent innovation in the budget 
and appropriation process. To be the mine sweeper in the 
process, it has to be amended to remove its present anti-
timeliness features. Section 82 of the Constitution, though 
in conformity with OECD best country practice should 
be amended as a result of its excessive abuse by virtually 
all past and present Presidents. A budget law, such as the 
US Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 
1974, be enacted to set down not just timelines for the 
budget enactment process but also create a nonpartisan 
expert budget office that is dedicated to the National 
Assembly—a counterpart of the Budget Office in the 
Office of the President.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the Media and 
public opinion (Wehner & Renzio 2012) should rise to the 
occasion by condemning the Executive (President) and 
the Legislature for the intentional late presentation and 
late enactment of the Appropriation Act by the President 
and the National Assembly respectively.
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CONCLUSION
This paper examined the Nigerian National Assembly and 
the budget process with a view to tackling the perennial 
problem of late presentation of the Appropriation Bill to 
the National Assembly by the President—a Constitutional 
duty imposed on the President by Section 81(1) of the 
Constitution. The paper established that since 1999, 
successive Presidents, have failed to meet the international 
good practice of presenting the budget to the National 
Assembly 2-4 months before the commencement of 
the next financial year. The study found that though 
Section 81(1) of the Constitution provides the timeframe 
within which the President is to lay the Appropriation 
Bill before the NASS, no timeline is provided. Section 
81(1) of the Constitution, thus, became subject to abuse 
by successive Nigerian Presidents. The enactment of 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2007 intended to 
tighten the loose ends in Section 81(1) compounded the 
problem of late submission of the appropriation bills 
to the National Assembly. This has frequently led to 
reversionary budget provision under Section 82 of the 
Constitution with all its negative consequences, including 
delay in the implementation of the new policy initiatives 
and investment projects that ought to be implemented 
with new budget. To ensure timeliness in the passage of 
the Appropriation Acts, Sections 81(1) and 82 of the 1999 
Constitution and the FRA 2007 were recommended for 
amendment. A budget law such as the US Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 1974, be enacted.
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